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Adaptive Comanagement in the Venice Lagoon? An Analysis of Current
Water and Environmental Management Practices and Prospects for
Change
Stefania Munaretto 1,2 and Dave Huitema 2
ABSTRACT. Adaptive comanagement (ACM) is often suggested as a way of handling the modern challenges of environmental
governance, which include uncertainty and complexity. ACM is a novel combination of the learning dimension of adaptive
management and the linkage dimension of comanagement. As has been suggested, there is a need for more insight on enabling
policy environments for ACM success and failure. Picking up on this agenda we provide a case study of the world famous
Venice lagoon in Italy. We address the following questions: first, to what extent are four institutional prescriptions typically
associated with ACM currently practiced in the Venice system? Second, to what extent is learning taking place in the Venice
system? Third, how is learning related to the implementation or nonimplementation of the prescriptions of ACM in the Venice
system?
Our analysis is based on interviews with stakeholders, participatory observation, and archive data. This paper demonstrates
that the prescriptions of ACM are hardly followed in the Venice lagoon, but some levels of cognitive learning do take place,
albeit very much within established management paradigms. Normative and relational learning are much rarer and when they
do occur, they seem to have a relatively opportunistic reason. We propose that in particular the low levels of collaboration,
because the governance system was deliberately set up in a hierarchical and mono-centric way, and the limited possibilities for
stakeholder participation are implicated in this finding because they cause low levels of social capital and an incapacity to
handle disagreements and uncertainty very well.
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INTRODUCTION
These days it is hard to find anyone disagreeing with the
notion that social-ecological systems (Berkes and Folke
1998) exhibit many “wicked” traits such as nonreducibility,
spontaneity, and variability (Dryzek 1987). Those wanting to
manage such systems face surprise, unpredictability, and the
possibility of unexpected “tipping points.” The literature on
adaptive management (Gunderson and Holling 2002) and
comanagement (e.g., Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000) speak to
these challenges and these two bodies of literature are
currently seen as converging into a literature on adaptive
comanagement (ACM; Olsson et al. 2004, Armitage et al.
2007). Adaptive management emphasizes learning and uses
structured experimentation in combination with flexibility as
ways to achieve this. Comanagement emphasizes the sharing
of rights, responsibilities, and power between different levels
and sectors of government and civil society. ACM, then, is a
novel combination of the learning dimension of adaptive
management and the linkage dimension of comanagement
(Olsson et al. 2004, Armitage et al. 2007). The literature on
ACM typically suggests four institutional prescriptions
should be followed to enhance adaptability: polycentricity,
participation, experimentation, and bioregional approach
(Lee 1999, Huitema et al. 2009).
ACM is attractive as an idea but very hard to introduce and
sustain in practice (Lee 1999). One could ask questions about
what holds back the introduction of ACM in real life settings,
but also analyze the consequences of nonimplementation. In
this vein, we follow Armitage et al. (2007:6-10), who pointed
to the need to move beyond “the limits” of ACM, and suggest
“policy implications” as a key theme for research, pointing to
the need for more insight on enabling policy environments and
“conditions of ACM success and failure.” Questions to be
answered under these headings relate to ways to establish
cross-level linkages, the conditions for partnerships that really
share power, and ways to move from cognitive to normative
learning.
We attempt to bring the discussion about the feasibility and
efficacy of the ACM institutional prescriptions further.
However, just assessing the ongoing efforts does not suffice.
Furthering the analytical agenda related to ACM also requires
understanding about the consequences of the implementation
or nonimplementation of the prescriptions in terms of the key
goal of learning. This is one aspect of what ACM seeks to
accomplish because the approach also emphasizes flexibility
and reversibility in infrastructural measures. We feel such a
restricted focus is warranted because learning logically
precedes course reversals, or the dismantling of flexible
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infrastructures. To analyze learning, we apply the typology,
i.e., cognitive, normative, and relational learning, that was
described in this journal by Huitema et al. (2010). Therefore,
we answer three questions, centered on the management of
the Venice lagoon in Italy:
 To what extent are the four institutional prescriptions
typically associated with ACM currently followed in the
Venice system?
 To what extent is learning taking place in the Venice
system?
 How is learning related to the implementation or
nonimplementation of the prescriptions?
We describe our theoretical framework, our methodology,
and the social-ecological context of our case study. We apply
the ACM prescriptions as a normative framework for
assessing the ongoing water and environmental management
efforts at safeguarding the Venice lagoon. In so doing, we
provide a critique of the current safeguarding measures that
are being implemented in this world famous city. We analyze
the level of learning and relate it to the prescriptions in the
subsequent four sessions. We conclude this article by
discussing our findings and providing several suggestions for
improving the management system so as to increase the
possibilities for learning.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We briefly illustrate the four institutional prescriptions
typically associated with ACM, the concept of learning and
learning typologies. Because the arguments we are making
are based on articles already published in this journal (see
Huitema et al. 2009, 2010) we will be succinct and the reader
who is interested in a full explanation, including for instance
a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the four
prescriptions, is referred to these earlier publications.
The first ACM prescription revolves around polycentricity.
Polycentric governance systems are defined as systems in
which “political authority is dispersed to separately
constituted bodies with overlapping jurisdictions that do not
stand in hierarchical relationship to each other” (Skelcher
2005:89). The literature on polycentric governance initially
focused on the importance of local self-control, making
governance fit with local political preferences (e.g., Ostrom
et al. 1961). More recent literature (e.g., Dietz et al. 2003,
Karkkainen 2004, Ostrom 2005) suggests that polycentric
governance systems are more resilient and better able to cope
with change and uncertainty. The reasons for this are, first,
that issues with different geographical scopes can be managed
at different scales. Second, polycentric systems have a high
degree of overlap and redundancy, and this makes them less
vulnerable: if one unit fails, others may take over their
functions (see e.g., Granovetter 1983, Perrow 1999). Finally,
the large number of units makes it possible to experiment with
new approaches so that the units can have the opportunity to
learn from each other (Ostrom 2005).
The second prescription relates to public participation. We
define public participation as the taking part, by ordinary
citizens or their collectives, in the processes of government
and/or governance; we refer to situations in which a substantial
number of citizens play a part in the process by which leaders
are chosen and policies are shaped and implemented. Public
participation is expected to contribute to a better understanding
of the social-ecological system, because all relevant sources
of information are used with greater reflexivity, as actors learn
to understand how others see the issues. This results in
increased legitimacy and support for decisions taken, because
actors are less likely to oppose decisions they have made
themselves, and in greater accountability and transparency,
because decisions need to be publicly explained and motivated
(see e.g., Coenen et al. 1998, Huitema 2002, Ridder et al. 2005,
Mostert et al. 2007).
The third institutional prescription, experimentation, is about
planned interventions in the social-ecological system and the
monitoring of their results to learn about ecosystems
functioning while managing (e.g., Walters and Holling 1990,
Lee 1999, Richter et al. 2003). Any intervention or policy can
be seen as an experiment, a way of testing hypotheses (e.g.,
Walters 1997, Pahl-Wostl 2006) and an opportunity for
learning by doing. In the policy sciences, experimentation is
seen as a methodology for factual learning, but the prospects
for more reflexive forms of learning are deemed to be dimmer
(see e.g., Fischer 1995, Greenberg et al. 2003). Some authors,
however, suggest that experiments can function as “boundary
objects” for bringing in multiple stakeholders (Huitema and
Turnhout 2009). Even when an experiment might have only
a factual learning agenda, greater reflexiveness might be an
additional effect because those involved in the experiment can
improve network relations through repeated interactions and
the emergence of trust (Lejano and Ingram 2009). This in turn
is expected to increase their capacity to deal with uncertainty
and change (e.g., Moberg and Galaz 2005).
The fourth prescription of ACM is to organize management
at the bioregional level such as a river basin, also when such
a bioregion crosses administrative boundaries. Among
governance scholars, the creation of institutions at the
appropriate scale is discussed as a matter of “optimization”
(Gibson et al. 1998) or “fit” and “interplay” (Young 2002).
The arguments speaking in favor of the creation of a
bioregional approach are mainly related to the perceived
failures of existing resource management institutions. These
include lack of recognition of ecological interdependencies
between ecological processes at multiple scales; lack of
cooperation between institutions; lack of transparency,
making the institutional structure difficult to understand for
outsiders and thereby limiting public participation;
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overlooking of problems that do not fit in established
programs; and finally, the existence of a lax management
setting in which special interests such as farmers and industry
can dominate (Schlager and Blomquist 2000 describe these
issues for river basin organizations). Institutions at the
ecosystem level are supposed to address these.
In this article we are interested in the learning that is taking
place in the Venice lagoon governance system. One of the
key activities of the governance system is the production of
policies that will steer its interventions in the ecosystem.
Thus, we are interested in policy learning, which we can
define as “relatively enduring alterations of thought or
behavioral intentions that result from experience and that are
concerned with the attainment (or revision) of public policy”
(Sabatier 1998:104; for a more elaborate discussion see
Huitema et al. 2010 and Haug et al. 2011).
Within the literature three critical aspects of learning have
been identified, namely: who learns, what is learned, and to
what effect? (Bennett and Howlett 1992). The literature is
fairly imprecise over what exactly is meant by these three
aspects. However, they provide a useful framework around
which we can understand how learning in an appraisal process
may lead to more reflexive critiques of policy goals.
As to the question of who learns, the basic distinction is
between policy makers and societal actors. Some authors,
such as Hall (1993), largely focus on the lessons that policy
makers draw from their experiences, whereas others have
shown greater interest in the way in which groups of societal
actors, such as “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier 1988) or
“epistemic communities” (Haas 1992), learn, whether in
interaction with policy makers or not. Obviously, the way the
general public learns about policies is also relevant, but this
is the topic of a different literature, the literature on agenda
formation and agenda setting (see Wanta 1997, McCombs
2005).
As for what is being learned, most writing on policy learning
distinguishes between different types and different degrees
of learning (see Swartling and Nilsson 2007). Regarding the
types of lessons learned, Webler et al. (1995) suggest that
there is a difference between the “cognitive enhancement” of
parties, i.e., the acquisition of knowledge, and their “moral
development,” i.e., how individuals come to be able to make
judgments about right and wrong. Others have pointed to the
importance of what we may refer to as relational learning.
This type of learning relates to issues such as trust building,
changes in the ability to collaborate, and changes in the ability
to understand another party’s goals and preferences (see e.g.,
Imperial and Hennessey 1999, Imperial 2005; Table 1).
As for what effect policy learning is intended, the overview
of Bennett and Howlett (1992) suggests that most authors
associate policy learning with policy change, in the sense that
they only want to speak of policy learning in cases where
policies have been modified or new policies have been
adopted. In our opinion, this is a dubious assumption, for two
reasons. The first is that policy change is often a result of other
factors than policy learning. One can think of changes in
government, bargaining between parties in the policy process,
the emergence of powerful lobby groups, etc. Second, even if
policy learning does occur, it does not always express itself in
the form of policy change, but may equally result in a better
foundation for existing policies. This could also be seen as a
form of policy learning, because the evidence base for the
current policy would have increased in such a case.
Table 1. Types of policy learning measured.
Typology of policy learning
Cognitive
learning
Factual learning without changing underlying
norms, values, belief systems
Normative
learning
Learning encompassing a change in norms, values,
and belief systems
Relational
learning
Enhanced trust, improved understanding of
mindsets of others
DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The empirical findings presented in this article are based on
secondary analysis of scientific accounts (e.g., Dente et al.
2001, Giupponi et al. 2001); and archive analysis of legal and
policy documents, assessment and thematic reports, and local
newspaper articles between 2004 and 2011 (e.g., Il Gazzettino,
Il Corriere del Veneto). We also have held 16 semistructured
interviews with key policy makers and stakeholders in the
Venetian basin between March and June 2010.
All interviewees had extensive knowledge about the
safeguarding of the Venice lagoon and in particular on water
and environmental management. They were selected on the
basis of their working position and their expertise, and their
views on the safeguarding of Venice. We asked questions
about options and challenges for the safeguarding of Venice,
effectiveness and the impacts of the existing institutional
arrangements, visions for the future of Venice, and policy
needs to reform the current institutional system. The
interviewees requested to remain anonymous and therefore
their names are not reported here.
By analyzing this material we gained understanding about
actors’ perspectives, their networks and coalitions, authority
and power relations, informal rules, and discourses on the
safeguarding of Venice and their evolution in time. The
interpretation of the data was facilitated by the fact that the
first author has firsthand experience on the functioning of the
Venice system, having worked for seven years in the role of
member of the technical secretariat of the Ufficio di Piano
(UdP), a technical committee advising the national
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government on priorities for safeguarding Venice and its
lagoon. She was involved in the preparation of and attended
all 72 UdP meetings from 2004 to 2011. Most information
connected with these meetings (minutes, notes, presentations)
is confidential; however the UdP released a number of
documents that are available at: www.magisacque.it/uff_piano/
uff_piano.htm. The involvement of the first author in
meetings of the UdP may have introduced a bias toward either
favoring or disfavoring the outcome. However, we think our
perspective goes beyond the policy dominated views of the
administrations and the government because the UdP is a
technical advisory committee that gained information from
all different public and private organizations in charge of
safeguarding the Venice lagoon.
THE VENICE LAGOON SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL
SYSTEM
The Venice lagoon is the largest coastal lagoon of the
Mediterranean region. About 60 km² of sand strips interrupted
by three inlets separate the lagoon from the North Adriatic
Sea. An intricate network of rivers, streams, and artificial
channels spanning on about 2000 km² of catchment basin
ensure the inflow of freshwater into the lagoon through
several estuaries. About 87% of the total 550 km² lagoon
surface is open to the tide, with the closed surfaces occupied
by fish farming. Land covers about 8% of the lagoon and is
spread over more than one hundred islands, coastal strips,
reclaimed land, and banks (Fig. 1). The lagoon ecosystems
are diverse, including typical coastal and marine
environments, i.e., beaches and dunes at the littorals; brackish
environments, i.e., salt marshes, mud flats, and shallows in
the lagoon basin; and fresh water environments along
waterways and rivers estuaries flowing into the lagoon.
The UNESCO World Heritage historical city of Venice is
located at the heart of the lagoon. The population of the islands
has been declining from 170,000 inhabitants in the 1950s
down to 90,000 at present. Inhabitants mostly moved to the
nearby mainland. The 2000 ha chemical and petrochemical
industrial area of Porto Marghera (Fig. 1) is nowadays heavily
contaminated. Some industrial plants have been abandoned
and a cleaning-up plan is being implemented under the
responsibility of the Ministry of the Environment. Outside
the cities, agriculture is the prevailing use of land in the lagoon
catchments basin.
Humans, water, and nature are profoundly interrelated in the
lagoon. Morphological instability and water level variation
represent the two major threats for the physical survival of
the lagoon. The diversion of the major rivers, the
reconfiguration of the inlets’ morphology, the excavation of
navigation channels, along with wave motion and modern
clam harvesting techniques have caused severe erosion, loss
of typical habitats and biodiversity, and the progressive
transformation of the lagoon into a marine environment.
Water level variation in the lagoon is a phenomenon driven
by tides and storm surges. Because of natural and human
induced subsidence and sea-level rise, frequency of floods has
dramatically increased over the last 60 years with peaks of
10-12 events in a year over the last decade. At present, climate
change is considered one of the possible major drivers of future
alteration of the lagoon ecosystem and of more frequent floods
in the city of Venice.
Fig. 1. The Venice lagoon, its catchment basin, and the
nearshore sea for planning and management purposes
according to the Special Law (Source: Regione del Veneto -
Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione e Prevenzione
Ambientale del Veneto [ARPAV]).
National and local governments started to systematically
address the safeguarding of Venice and its lagoon in the early
1970s. At that time the Italian government established a
specific legislative regime known as the Special Law for
Venice (Fig. 2). The regime set objectives, responsibilities,
instruments, measures, and financial resources for carrying
out safeguarding activities. Major goals were the protection
of urban centers from floods, the protection of coastal strips
from erosion and sea storms, the re-establishment of the hydro-
geo-morphological equilibrium of the lagoon, the abatement
of water pollution both in the catchment basin and the lagoon
basin, and the promotion of socioeconomic development of
the Venice area. An integrated system of storm surge barriers
at the inlets and local defenses, i.e., raising public pavements
and restoring banks, to protect the urban centers from floods
are two major infrastructural works under construction.
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Fig. 2. Institutional setting established by the Special Law for Venice and other related regulations. Legend: L. = Law; R.
L. = Regional Law; DPCM = Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers; Acc.Prog. = Interinstitutional Agreement
(Source: Based on the Special Law for Venice, Government and Ministerial decrees, Veneto Region, and local
administration regulations and laws).
At the national level, the Ministry of Infrastructure is involved
in the management of the lagoon through its local branch, the
Venice Water Authority. Dealing with water management
and navigation control in the lagoon since 1907, the Authority
is also in charge of the planning and execution of major
safeguarding works. Works are carried out by a private
concessionaire of the Ministry of Infrastructure, called
Consorzio Venezia Nuova (CVN). The CVN is building the
storm surge barriers, the local defenses, and the coastal
defenses. It also implements a plan for morphological
restoration including reconstruction of morphological
structures and natural habitats and provides for the scientific
basis for it.
The Special Law implies that the Veneto Region, the Venice
and Chioggia municipalities, and the Safeguarding
Commission for Venice are involved in the management of
the lagoon. The Veneto Region is in charge of abating water
pollution in the lagoon catchment basin by allocating funds
to local authorities, e.g., municipalities and water bodies. The
Venice and Chioggia municipalities are in charge of the
maintenance of historical, cultural, architectural heritage and
of supporting local socioeconomic development, partly
through ad hoc constituted municipal companies. Finally, the
Safeguarding Commission for Venice expresses its binding
advice to project developers and approving authorities on all
building works and territorial transformation planned.
From 1984 to 2010 the government allocated about 10.3
billion Euros to achieve the safeguarding objectives, of which
9.6 billion Euros have already been spent (Ufficio di Piano
2010). Decisions about major safeguarding works and
allocation of funds are made by an interministerial committee
(Comitatone) in which the regional and local governments are
also represented. Since 2004, the Comitatone has been
supported by the Ufficio di Piano, a technical committee of
national and international experts, and national, regional, and
local policy makers.
Alongside the Special Law regime, regional water boards were
established in the early 1990s. These organizations will soon
be replaced by river basin management authorities recently
established under the EU Water Framework Directive. All
these changes have so far left the Venice Water Authority
responsibilities untouched.
IMPLEMENTING ADAPTIVE COMANAGEMENT IN
THE VENICE LAGOON: POLYCENTRIC
INSTITUTIONS?
The complex division of responsibilities and the extensive set
of public and semipublic authorities involved in the
management of the Venice lagoon suggest that the system
indeed exhibits a certain degree of polycentricity in the sense
that power is shared among many actors with overlapping
responsibilities. However, power is unevenly distributed
among key actors and cooperation is limited. Our interviewees
suggest that the Venice Water Authority, which is a national
agency, and its concessionaire, the CVN, are excessively
influential actors in the system and that a hierarchical approach
to decisions and lack of trust stemming from unresolved
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institutional disputes have led to a breakdown of cooperation
among public actors.
Orchestrating all institutions in the system requires a lot of
collaboration, which is difficult to accomplish because
governments have different levels of influence on decisions.
The Venice Water Authority and its concessionaire
successfully network within the national government but do
not see fit to link with the local authorities and the community.
Having a direct relationship with the national government
contributed to a neglect of the need to create local support for
national decisions. In reaction to that, local authorities,
particularly the Venice Municipality and several
environmental groups, developed an opposing and sometimes
ideological attitude toward most national decisions, the
Venice Water Authority, and the CVN (S. Munaretto,
interviews: national agency officers, practitioners, June
2010). Cooperation requires a culture of willingness to work
together. The culture of the Italian government is, however,
very different. Every government agency is out to assert its
leadership and seeks to streamline decision procedures in such
a way that other actors are essentially overridden (Keating
1997, Mack Smith 1997, Huysseune 2003). The idea of a
hierarchical approach is embedded even more strongly in the
Venice lagoon because it is a unique case in Italy in which a
national governmental agency (the Venice Water Authority)
still has water management responsibilities whereas in the
rest of the country they have been passed to the regions.
However, the Veneto Region has water management
responsibilities in the entire surrounding territory of the
lagoon, and challenges the national control. In its turn, the
municipality of Venice calls for greater freedom to decide
safeguarding policies over its territory. The overall effect of
this competition for control is that cooperation becomes very
difficult. Interinstitutional agreements, by which costs of
works are shared and official procedures simplified, are the
vehicle for formally arranging the collaboration between
government actors but the few agreements that have been
reached required very long and painstaking negotiations.
IMPLEMENTING ADAPTIVE COMANAGEMENT
IN THE VENICE LAGOON: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION?
There is no tradition of public participation and the decision
making culture in the lagoon is not favorable to it (Dente et
al. 2001, Giupponi et al. 2001). Despite some progress in
encouraging public involvement in decision making, also in
fulfillment of EU requirements, past experiences did not
produce successful outcomes in the sense that either the
participative processes were not completed fully, or feedback
was not provided to the participants. In both cases the result
was that people felt frustrated and lost motivation in the
participative processes (S. Munaretto, interview: scientist,
June 2010). Findings of Dente et al. (2001) indicate that the
public consultation process on Venice issues is dominated by
environmental groups, mostly being those people who engage
in participative processes. This is a pity because other societal
actors also have a high level of awareness of local issues and
their participation in management decisions could be
beneficial for understanding functioning and problems of the
Venice social-ecological system and finding solutions.
Although in principle open to all relevant stakeholders, public
participation regarding the safeguarding of Venice remains at
the level of what Arnstein (1969) calls “tokenism.” This is
because participatory forums are hardly organized and most
arguments brought forward by participants are commonly
ignored. The ongoing discussion about the Special Law may
serve as an example. In 2010 the national government
appointed the Minister of Public Administration and
Innovation to consider options for reforming the law. The
Minister organized two meetings with governments and
societal organizations, invited written comments from both of
them, and launched a web forum to discuss the issue. When a
group of citizens and environmentalists wanted to attend one
of the presentations the minister was giving to the institutional
stakeholders, they were denied access with the argument that
the meeting was only for the authorities (Mencini 2010).
Having no opportunities for further comments, the societal
stakeholders turned to the media to express their opinions.
Thus, while “informing” and “consulting” took place, follow-
ups or further information were not provided and it is not clear
how and to what extent the different contributions were
considered in the draft law. The fact that opportunities for
interaction, representation, and dialogue are so limited has a
sad consequence in that a number of disagreements about
decisions turn into conflicts and are subsequently brought to
the courts. The case of the storm surge barriers is emblematic
of the described situation. During the years, environmental
groups, who are in fact often joined by the municipality of
Venice, have brought nine appeals, all rejected, against the
construction of the barriers to the Administrative Regional
Tribunal (TAR) and the Council of State. In 2005, after WWF
and other environmental groups claimed violation of the Bird
and Habitat Directives (79/409/CEE and 92/43/CEE), the
European Commission initiated an infraction procedure
against Italy on this case because it agreed that the measures
to prevent deterioration of the EU protected habitats were
indeed not sufficient. The case was settled in 2009 after the
Italian government committed to fund a plan of compensation
measures and accepted that an independent party would be
monitoring the works. For environmentalists, bringing the
case to court was the only chance to prevent the barriers from
being constructed.
IMPLEMENTING ADAPTIVE COMANAGEMENT IN
THE VENICE LAGOON: EXPERIMENTATION?
The third prescription we are interested in is experimentation.
Numerous research experiments mostly confined to
biophysical domains such as water, ecosystems, and related
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technical and technological studies provide scientific basis
for environmental management in the Venice system.
However, the interpretation and use of knowledge is often
questioned and politicized. As for policies, there is very
limited willingness to evaluate and change them.
The morphological restoration and the reuse of dredged
sediment in the lagoon are key examples of experiments
leading to new scientific knowledge and in the case of the
morphological reconstructions also to improved environmental
management practices. In over 15 years of morphological
reconstructions, the Venice Water Authority has developed
extensive technical and scientific knowledge that has been
used to update the 1993 morphological restoration plan. The
result is a new plan, to be finalized in 2012, that adopts a more
ecological perspective in the reconstruction of morphological
structures than the previous one. The Venice Water Authority
also conducted several experiments to test the possibility of
safely using lightly polluted dredged sediment for the
morphological reconstructions. Unlike the morphological
plan case, evidence that using this sediment can be considered
safe has not led to alterations in management practices yet.
This is because the involved authorities cannot agree on
procedures for revising the current agreement on
environmental safety criteria for the excavation,
transportation, and reuse of dredged sediment.
The Special Law is the foremost example of the difficulty of
thinking of policies as experiments and consequently
adjusting them according to the level of attainment of the
outcomes. The establishment of the Special Law for Venice
is the biggest intervention made in the system in past decades.
The underlying philosophy is steeped in a hierarchical
government tradition, assigning great responsibilities to
experts. Ideally, the Special Law itself would be evaluated
occasionally from a range of perspectives, generally
environmental and economic. The closest example to a policy
evaluation is the study of Dente et al. (2001), which suggests
that the centralistic government system set by the Special Law
has substantially failed. This is mostly because the
interministerial committee has limited its activity to irregular
meetings for allocating financial resources to the local
governments and making decisions on major safeguarding
works instead of taking coordinating functions. However, the
current process of reforming the Special Law is based neither
on such ideas nor on any other systematic evaluation.
IMPLEMENTING ADAPTIVE COMANAGEMENT
IN THE VENICE LAGOON: A BIOREGIONAL
APPROACH?
The first attempt to adopt a bioregional approach in the water
management sector in Venice dates back to the 16th century.
At that time the Republic of Venice established the Venice
Water Authority with water management responsibility over
a broad territory spanning from the Alps to the lagoon to
ensure hydraulic safety and maintenance of navigation in the
lagoon. After the end of the Republic in 1797, the Venice
Water Authority saw its responsibilities and territory changed
several times. In 1907, it was finally re-established as local
agency of the Ministry of Infrastructure with water
management responsibilities over the lagoon and the
watersheds related to its hydraulics. The Venice Water
Authority lost its river management responsibilities to the
regional level as consequence of a decentralization policy in
the 1980s. At present its jurisdiction is limited to the lagoon
basin and some other areas outside. According to Rusconi
(2002) the Venice Water Authority, in its old configuration,
was a good example of the river basin management approach,
creating higher levels of hydraulic safety than the current
setup.
With the advent of the water boards and the European Water
Framework Directive, the concept of management at a river
basin scale entered or re-entered Italian public law. However,
the water board does not have formal decision making power
over the lagoon, which is still under the jurisdiction of the
Venice Water Authority, and the establishment of a Venetian
subdistrict spanning the lagoon, the catchment basin, and the
nearshore sea is hindered by issues of leadership, authority,
tasks, and debates about responsibilities.
COGNITIVE LEARNING IN THE VENICE SYSTEM
Cognitive learning in the Venice management system is
confined mostly to the scientific community, and is aimed at
furthering predetermined solutions. Large investments of
national, regional, and local governments in scientific research
have led to improved environmental management practices,
e.g., the morphological restoration. There is, however, a
tendency to focus research on issues related to the building of
large-scale infrastructure such as the storm surge barriers.
Specialized experts, most commonly engineers with years of
field experience, have come to cover many high-level decision
making positions in the field of water and environment
management at all levels of government. The general public
and part of the scientific community in Venice perceive their
approach to environmental management to be too technically
oriented and lacking an interdisciplinary perspective
necessary to integrate the ecological and the social dimensions
of the lagoon system (S. Munaretto, interviews: practitioners,
scientists, April 2010). In addition, some local scientists
question much of the scientific knowledge on the Venice
system produced by the engineers of the CVN, e.g.,
mathematical models of the lagoon, arguing that it is functional
to the infrastructural works and therefore far from being
comprehensive and fully objective (S. Munaretto, interview:
scientists, April 2010).
Unfortunately, the cognitive learning that occurs within the
expert community does not always cross over to other groups,
mostly because access to new findings is kept restricted.
Ecology and Society 17(2): 19
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss2/art19/
Scientists and policy makers are generally not open to share
knowledge with the public either because there is no culture
of participation or because they want to avoid long
discussions. Lack of resources also limits opportunity for
members of the public to develop their own base of
knowledge, although increasingly, citizen collectives are
organizing with the purpose of gathering scientific
information on the functioning of the lagoon ecosystem (S.
Munaretto, interview: scientist, April 2010). With some
imagination, these citizens could link up with local scientists
to form a “shadow network” (Olsson et al. 2006, Meijerink
and Huitema 2010) and develop alternative conceptions of
management.
NORMATIVE LEARNING IN THE VENICE
SYSTEM
We found little normative learning within the three groups.
Within the scientific community some scientists we
interviewed claimed that the new morphological plan does
not challenge the old management approach even though a
broad group of scientists was involved. Discussion on this
issue was not possible because the whole process of
knowledge generation was controlled and results had to be
processed and approved before being shared (S. Munaretto,
interview: scientists, April 2010).
Among policy makers it looks like old solutions are revived
more often than new ideas are developed. Now that the
discussion about the most controversial infrastructure, i.e.,
the storm surge barriers, has come to a resolution, the Venice
Water Authority and the Venice Municipality have started
changing perspectives about the safeguarding of Venice. In
recent times, they have started suggesting in the media that
two of the three goals of the Special Law can be considered
achieved because most hydraulic infrastructures are either
completed or under construction and the environmental
protection is in progress although there are some delays.
Conversely, interventions to support the local economy have
been inadequate to achieve the third goal of the law, i.e.,
socioeconomic development, and need to be redefined. They
now push for a new agenda that includes the construction of
new large-scale infrastructure, an off-shore petrochemical
and container-ship harbor. However, this cannot be
considered normative learning. Rather it is an attempt to apply
the same type of solution, the building of massive
infrastructure, to solve several problems simultaneously.
For the public, normative learning seems limited by the
culture of going to the courts to solve disputes. By going to
court these people show an unwillingness to question their
values and their reasons. They are also not engaging in a
constructive discussion because in court evidence is distorted
or selectively presented. More evidence of the dearth of
normative learning is demonstrated by the fact that some
environmentalists still call for suspending the construction of
the barriers and revising the project (Italia Nostra, www.itali
anostra-venezia.org/).
RELATIONAL LEARNING IN THE VENICE
SYSTEM
As for relational learning, we see that reciprocal trust and
understanding do not improve and networks do not evolve that
much across the three groups. Some of the reasons for this are
that scientific knowledge is not fully shared, the governmental
system is rather stable and not much open to new people, and
court cases annihilate trust among actors.
One reason for limited collaborative networks and trust within
the scientific community is that some scientists still oppose
the partially finished storm surge barriers. This failure to
accept what has become reality hinders a constructive
discussion on the future management of this infrastructure.
The fact that scientific knowledge does not flow freely in the
system also does not help relational learning. In this regard,
the updating of the morphological plan was a missed
opportunity for the scientists involved to understand each
other’s knowledge (S. Munaretto, interviews: scientists,
practitioners, April 2010).
The Special Law has shaped networks and coalitions in the
field of water and environmental management for more than
30 years. Over a decade of political and administrative stability
gave policy makers time to develop and consolidate networks
with the scientific community and societal actors, and to build
institutional memory. When several policy makers either
retired or were replaced between 2009 and 2010, institutional
memory suddenly disappeared and a window of opportunity
opened for new people to enter the system and develop novel
coalitions and networks. However, what happened appears to
have been a game of musical chairs because a number of these
policy makers had a new position in other local public
organizations and people coming from other societal groups
such as NGOs remained excluded. This suggests that networks
have not really evolved in the system.
Although a real change did not occur in the system, relations
could improve in the future as a result of a new alliance
emerging on the construction of the offshore harbor between
the Venice Municipality, the Venice Water Authority, and the
Port Authority. Revealing a smart, strategic reorientation of
governmental and private organizations, this alliance seems
to be blowing off the historical opposition about the storm
surge barriers. The memory of past disputes that these leaders
carry along, however, could make them suspicious with regard
to new infrastructural works to be carried out in the lagoon.
LINKING LEARNING AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION/NONIMPLEMENTATION OF
THE ADAPTIVE COMANAGEMENT
PRESCRIPTIONS
In our opinion, the degree to which the prescriptions on
polycentricity and participation are followed bears most of the
responsibility for the relatively low learning levels we have
found (Table 2). The management system of the lagoon,
although fragmented to a large degree, has clearly not been
Table 2. Adaptive comanagement, learning, and connections between the two in the Venice system
ACM prescriptions Learning
Connections between ACM and
learning
Polycentricity (-)
Highly hierarchical and
mono-centric governmental
system
National agenda and limited
local power: leadership and
authority claimed
Little incentive to public actor
interaction
Official institutions meet and
cooperate only when there is
dependency (especially
resource dependency)
Interinstitutional agreements
are venues for interaction but
used only in situations of
dependency
Participation (-)
No tradition of participation,
and decision making culture
is not favorable to it, although
EU regulations changed this
somewhat
Participation as tokenism
(Arnstein 1969): public is
informed and consulted but
there is no follow-up, no
mechanism to integrate public
knowledge
Limited venue for
participation generates
frustration that turns into
court cases
Public is not organized:
environmental groups and
other groups often act
individually
Experimentation (+/-)
Experimentation as research
methodology has led to
improvements in water and
Cognitive learning (+/-)
Established in the scientific
community within a normative
paradigm of essentially building
infrastructure: well-developed
scientific and technical
knowledge
Not well established in the policy
making and social community
because:
o No complete free flow
of information in the
system
o Knowledge is not
always trusted
o Cases brought to court
to stop policy effects or
works, not for learning
Normative learning (-)
Not well established in the
scientific, policy making, and
social community because:
o No complete free flow
of information in the
system
o Knowledge is not
always trusted
o Disputes brought to
court
Institutional memory may be an
obstacle to change
Shift in policy agenda from
physical and environmental
protection to economic
development is opportunistic
because it does not bring new
ideas and values but reuses old
ideas to keep the system working
Relational learning (+/-)
Not well established in the
scientific, policy making, and
Polycentricity and learning
Hierarchical mono-centric
structure leads to overlooking
of interdependency;
opportunities for interaction
and cooperation are limited.
This leads to limited relational
learning
Existence of coalitions that are
more influential than others, a
national agenda with a narrow
mandate, closed networks
hamper relational learning
because there is no interest in
meeting among actors
Lack of polycentricity leads to
no reflection and no change of
perspectives therefore no
normative learning
Participation and learning
The frustration generated by
the low level of participation
does not incentivize relational
and normative learning
Going to court to suspend
policy effects or works is a
sign of unwillingness to all
forms of learning
Because of limited flow of
information in the system,
cognitive learning of societal
actors is low
Experimentation and learning
Experimentation taking place
within normative paradigm
allows cognitive learning but
not normative and relational
learning
Experiments do not serve as
boundary objects to draw
multiple stakeholders to the
environmental
management(e.g.,
morphological restoration,
mobile barriers)
Policies are not considered as
experiments
Interpretation and use of
scientific knowledge and
experiments is often
politicized; validity and
objectivity are questioned;
knowledge is distrusted by
actors
Bioregional approach (+/-)
Water management at
bioregional scale existed in
the past through the Venice
Water Authority; in the 1970s
regions took over
responsibilities; EU laws re-
establish river basin approach
Issues of leadership and
authority (region vs. Venice
Water Authority) hamper the
transition to river basin
management
social community until recent
times because of stable
governmental system, stable
coalitions, and networks that are
not open to other actors
In the last few years change of a
number of leaders in public
organizations opened windows of
opportunity for new coalitions;
too soon to tell if it will lead to
relational learning
No complete renovation, some
instances of change of position,
and no arrival of new people
Loss of institutional memory
with people left
debate about the lagoon; there
are no mechanisms to
challenge values and allow
new ideas and people to enter
the discussion
The way experiments are
designed and conducted affects
how much they are trusted and
therefore policy change
Bioregional approach and learning
Past experience in river basin
management led to building of
institutional memory as well as
cognitive and relational
learning to some extent
because actors have worked
together and created relations
and knowledge
Institutional memory about
past experience of bioregional
management limits normative
learning because actors tend to
act according to the memory
they have about the system;
agencies that used to rule the
system and had knowledge and
control of it still tend to act
according to those values and
beliefs
Collaboration and learning at
the bioregional scale occur if
people expect it; if there is
memory of one agency having
control and knowledge,
relational and normative
learning cannot improve
Dealing with existing
coalitions and institutions
become problematic when new
institutions are created over a
bioregion
Evaluation scale:
(-) limited; (+/-) to some extent; (+) present
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set up with polycentric governance in mind. The levels of
local control over decision processes are too small for that,
and the permeating design principle is one of top-down
control emphasizing a limited set of goals, essentially
building protective infrastructure. There are possibilities for
participation but these have not really opened up the system
to alternative voices because comments and criticisms are
largely ignored. The management community can in this
sense be compared to an epistemic community that is closed
to outsiders and works on the basis of an established paradigm
that must not be challenged. Outsiders, lacking a productive
venue for entering debates, resort to the courts, where
discussions normally focus on established positions and
discrediting the contentions of the opponents (Huitema 2002).
The degree of normative learning to emanate from a system
like that is low, as was to be expected. The only possible
exception to this finding is the higher importance of economic
development on the agenda of those who have built the flood
safety infrastructure. Here, we should probably be careful
about applying the term learning, however, because the
developments that have happened look relatively
opportunistic and the changed priority of economic
development for the Venice Water Authority could easily be
interpreted as an organization that has achieved its primary
goal, but is looking for a new challenge in which the same
approach can be applied. Constructing or expanding a harbor
is obviously related to creating a large-scale flood safety
infrastructure and fits established lines of working, in the
sense that companies that are knowledgeable and experienced
in building large-scale infrastructure will try to keep creating
the same type of works, so this might actually be an example
of a solution looking for a new problem rather than learning.
In addition, an adaptive management approach would suggest
adopting more flexible, reversible, and adaptable solutions
because system’s response to management practice is
uncertain. However, as a consequence of the new agenda,
former opponents are now starting to appreciate each other
more, and new coalitions are forged. Here too, the term
(relational) learning might be too optimistic because the new
coalitions coalesce around established interests and do not
emanate necessarily from new insights.
There is a certain level of experimentation going on in the
system. This refers to experiments in a literal sense, meaning
that physical interventions in the lagoon have taken place,
their effects were evaluated thoroughly, and new facts have
emerged. These have affected policies to a certain degree, but
it does appear that the policy system is lagging in the uptake
of these insights. We can say that these experiments have not
served as “boundary objects” that were able to draw multiple
stakeholders to the debate about the lagoon, and their set up
has been largely technocratic rather than participatory. Also,
there is no experimentation in the lagoon going on in the sense
of “policies as experiments,” because the openness to
alternative problem definitions or the arguing of alternative
policy priorities is very limited as shown by the discussion on
the revision of the Special Law. The effect of this on the
learning levels is visible, because cognitive learning takes
place only among those involved in said experiments and the
experiments do not fundamentally challenge policy paradigms
(as predicted by Fischer 1995).
Finally, management at the bioregional level is what used to
qualify the regime of the Venice lagoon, but with the advent
of regional government in Italy, this situation has changed. It
is interesting to observe how long the institutional memory
from that period has lasted, to both the advantage and
disadvantage of the management system. It has been
advantageous in the sense that most people working in a
fragmented set of water organizations still know their former
colleagues well and they can therefore easily reach for each
other. The disadvantage is, however, that almost anybody
working in the management system purports to provide “the”
bioregional view, which means that there is actually
contestation of authority. This factor has complicated the
implementation of the European Water Framework Directive,
which is supposed to work with river basin organizations. In
the Venice lagoon, the leading role in this process has not been
decided. Effectively there is thus not much of an active,
operational basin-wide management approach, but we have
not been able to detect much effect on learning levels, except
for the cognitive learning that results from the easy exchange
of information between former colleagues. As this network of
former colleagues becomes less dominant in the various
successor organizations, the exchange of information across
the basin might become more complicated because
information is clearly also a strategic resource for those
involved in the management of the lagoon.
Against this background, we conclude that in general the water
and environmental governance system in the Venice lagoon
exhibits limited implementation of the ACM prescriptions.
This has the consequence of a low level of learning in the
scientific, policy making, and civic communities. As predicted
by governance scholars (e.g., Fischer 1995), cognitive
learning in the scientific community is the only exception. As
long as shared paradigm and experimental design is not
questioned scientific knowledge and management practices
keep improving.
DISCUSSION
The case study of Venice brings to light at least four main
points of discussion in connection with the evolving debate
on adaptive governance, and linked to that, points to the
salience of certain questions for future research. First, the case
study presented here offers the opportunity to reflect on the
relative importance of the typical prescriptions that are
contained in the ACM literature with respect to the key
variable of learning (Lee 1999). The case suggests that
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especially public participation and polycentricity are
important and that the two can also be connected. Limited
opportunities for interaction can in fact be explained not only
by a lack of tradition of public participation but also by the
existence of a stable, centralized governance system that keep
actors disconnected and suspicious. This affects the level of
learning in the system and makes it difficult to design policy
experiments because scientists and policy makers need to
engage in a more elaborate and productive interplay for that
to happen (Walters and Holling 1990). Learning then can
relatively easily be constrained to the cognitive level, and be
made compatible with existing paradigms, thus limiting the
opportunity for research experiments to function as boundary
objects. We are less certain how to interpret our case study
when it comes to the importance of the bioregional approach
for learning. Our analysis does confirm the political nature
of organizational realignment, but above all it shows that in
a situation in which multiple organizations claim to be
working on the river basin scale, competition can ensue and
such competition can seriously hinder learning.
Related to that is our second main observation on the role of
institutional memory. The literature on resilience and
adaptive governance tends to discuss memory in a rather
positive vein, because memory is treated as a repository for
lessons learned. Memory helps prevent making the same
mistakes, and in cases where institutions collapse, memory
helps bring them back up to functionality. Such memory is
held by the people who have worked with the institutional
arrangements, and the longer their experience with such
arrangements, the more likely it is that they hold valuable
memories. However, the case of the Venice lagoon shows
that institutional memory can also be a limiting factor to
learning. Policy makers who used to manage a large water
basin have been resisting the re-establishment of a river basin
governmental setting unless this would reassert their
authority. Policy learning is clearly hampered by policy
makers’ values and beliefs, which are rooted on memories of
the times their organizations had control over a wide
bioregion. However, because this bioregional organization
has been split up and personnel divided over a range of new
organizations, there is suddenly a range of competing
organizations, who all want to operate on the bioregional
scale. This raises questions about the normative value of
institutional memory in the context of ACM. It would appear
that whether institutional memory is good or bad depends on
people’s values and beliefs about past actions and governance
experiences.
For our third point, we would like to turn the reader’s attention
to a paradox. Hierarchies are supposed to avoid
ineffectiveness of horizontal decision structures, which
typically lack clear lines of responsibility and authoritative
control. Polycentric governance literature has pointed to the
key role of leaders to overcome these problems because they
can build trust, manage conflict, link actors, initiate
partnerships, mobilize support for change, generate
knowledge, and develop and communicate visions of
ecosystems management (Folke et al. 2005). The Venice
system is hierarchically constructed. However, we see
competition for responsibility and authority that erodes
relational learning and does not favor the emergence of a real
leadership. The institutional stalemate that emanates from this
situation is hampering the establishment of a river basin
management authority according to the European Water
Framework Directive. Therefore, in this case hierarchies are
both ineffective and an obstacle to change.
The fourth point relates to more general considerations about
the applicability of ACM as a normative approach in
variegating circumstances. In our study we found the ACM to
be helpful for diagnosing a given governance system, i.e., to
identify salient features and to understand the basic character
of a situation (Young 2007). However, we advocate the
relative value of following the ACM. Our case study material
does underline the need to investigate more fundamental
attributes as precondition for the ACM to take place and be
effective and in particular we would like to raise questions
about the basic social and cultural requirements for ACM to
take place and be successful. The ACM framework might
assume certain social and cultural contexts that are not present
everywhere. Making these conditions explicit would allow
prioritizing actions for ACM successful implementation.
Focusing, for example, on policy change needed to make the
governance system more polycentric would make no sense if
the conditions to make that policy change happen are not there.
The Venice lagoon case study is emblematic of this need to
identify and address the fundamental attributes that make or
break ACM success. In the Venice case, a fundamental lack
of trust among actors proved to be reason for limited
communication and sharing of knowledge, and insufficient
institutional cooperation that turned into insufficient learning
in all societal groups. The Special Law regime is at least partly
responsible for this situation because it has created a
centralized, hierarchical governmental system that has kept
actors disconnected. Actors in Venice have developed
resentment and mistrust for each other, and stable but
dysfunctional patterns of interaction have developed from
these feelings. The relations between the actors have
crystallized in closed coalitions and networks that make policy
change difficult. In all, there is a serious lack of bridging social
capital (Putnam 1994) that could help traverse these divides.
However, there is little interest in developing such capital, as
is demonstrated by the halfhearted attempts at participation.
As Putnam (1994) has shown, there is a strong and persistent
relation between levels of social capital on the one hand and
governance patterns on the other, with low levels of social
capital leading to several pathologies. The question is then
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how to break such a situation open. Insights on transitions in
water management published in this journal (Meijerink and
Huitema 2010) suggest that one avenue through which such
changes occur is through changes in leadership. From this
perspective, it is disappointing that the leadership changes
that have occurred in Venice in the past few years have
involved the same people that were already in leading
positions. New opportunities of this sort may take a long time
to open up again because the political system in the Venice
region is traditionally rather stable.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyzed the level of implementation of four
typical ACM prescriptions, polycentricity, participation,
experimentation, and bioregional approach, and we
investigated the degree of cognitive, normative, and relational
learning taking place in a complex social-ecological system,
i.e., the Venice lagoon in Italy. We analyzed the connections
between implementation of the prescriptions and learning.
Our ultimate goal was to identify avenues for improvement
in the governance of the Venice system. The main conclusion
of this study is that in the Venice system the existence of the
Special Law inhibits participation and real polycentricity,
makes it difficult to change policy in accordance with
experimental results, and makes it difficult to deal with
problems at the bioregional scale. As a consequence, learning
is restricted to environmental management practices whereas
networks, values, and beliefs hardly evolve in the region.
The findings and the discussion of this study lead to one
concluding observation that is relevant in terms of prospects
for change in the Venice system. In our study we identified
a number of sources of change in Venice, e.g., the Water
Framework Directive, the new morphological restoration
plan, the regional and local elections, and the substitution of
agency directors, that so far have failed to support an ACM
approach mainly because the learning that emanates from
them is instrumental to a greater extent. To support change
in a more adaptive fashion, a condition that appears to be very
important at present is improving relational learning at all
societal levels. This calls for an effort to create increasing
opportunities for interactions between public actors and
societal stakeholders, and among public actors themselves
and societal stakeholders as a group. Before that, to make
interactions possible, people have to acknowledge the
interdependence of all segments of public policy and that the
democratization of public decision making can no longer be
ignored. This process will require a long time and the
engagement of all relevant actors in Venice.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss2/art19/
responses/
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